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BANK OF UTAH, N.A.,
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT-DEFENDANT
Appellant First Interstate Bank of Utah, formerly
named Walker Bank & Trust Company (hereinafter referred to as
the "Bank"), respectfully submits this Reply Brief in answer
to the new matters set forth in the brief of plaintiffrespondent Kenneth L. Rothey as Trustee of the Belnap Family
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Rothey").

As in its

Brief, the Bank will refer to the governing documents as
follows:

The promissory note evidencing the Bank's May 13,

1963, loan of $30,000.00 to Utahna P. Belnap is the "Note",
and the trust deed securing the Note is the "Trust Deed";
the two lawsuits brought by LeGrande L. Belnap during the
probate of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap which attacked the
validity of his wife's title to the property covered by the
Trust Deed and the Trust Deed itself are referred to as the
"Actions".
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BASED ON PRINCIPLES
OF RES JUDICATA
A. Rothey has not Cross-Appealed
and is Consequently Barred from Contending that the Trial Court Erred in
Rejecting Rothey's Res Judicata Defense.
The Bank has appealed from the trial court's judgment that, due to the Bank's alleged failure timely to advise
Rothey or his predecessors of certain attorney's fees and
costs incurred in the Actions, the Bank is estopped from
collecting such fees as a part of the obligation secured by
the Trust Deed.

(Conclusions No. 6 and 7; R. 348). The

Bank's Brief is largely concerned with demonstrating that the
theory created by the trial court was neither pleaded nor
argued by Rothey, that the trial court's theory is contrary
to law and good sense, that no evidence supports the trial
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court's findings, and that the trial court made no finding,
and no evidence establishes the essential requirement, that
Rothey or his predecessors relied in any respect upon the
Bank's conduct.

Despite the fact that the trial court

entered judgment based on its unpleaded, unprecedented, and
unsupported estoppel theory —

and despite the fact that the

Bank's brief necessarily concerns itself with demonstrating
the trial court's error in relying on such a theory —

Rothey

begins Point I of his brief with the following proposition:
"Clearly the primary thrust of the arguments of the Bank is
that since Respondent did not specifically plead the defense
of res judicata, there can be no bar to recovery by the Bank
on that basis."

Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff, at 11.

Rothey then goes on to argue at length that the doctrine of
res judicata operates to bar the Bank's recovery of the
disputed attorney's fees.

Ld., at 11-17.

Rothey's attempt

to circumvent the real issue in this case is unavailing.
Rothey concedes that, in violation of the explicit
command of Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he never
pleaded res judicata as an affirmative defense in this case.
Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff, at 11. The best that Rothey
can state is that he "did plead facts constituting res judicata. "

Id.

In fact, however, Rothey's reply to the Bank's

Rothey's emphasis, as a basis for affirmance, on a theory
rejected by the trial court, is peculiar, but understandable.
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counterclaim, (R. 78-81), can be searched in vain for any
theory even remotely resembling the res judicata argument
that Rothey now urges.

Similarly, Rothey failed to identify

this theory when asked by interrogatory to "state each fact
supporting or providing the basis for the allegations"
contained in his defenses to the Bank's counterclaim.
152-154).

(R.

Accordingly, when Rothey attempted to present his

res judicata theory at trial, the Bank interposed a
continuing objection.

(T., 2/7/83, at 107-108; R. 478; T.,

2/8/83, at 91-92; R. 587-588).

The trial court ultimately

agreed with the Bank's objection to Rothey's attempt to raise
his res judicata defense and, after both parties had
presented their evidence, ruled as follows:
It would have been wisdom on my part and
would have saved wear and tear on the
Court and wear and tear on the court
reporter and expense to your clients when
you appeal my order to the Supreme Court
to have announced that this is not a case
of res judicata, there having been no
affirmative defense raised and the Court
not having received a motion nor granted
a motion about res judicata.
(T., 2/8/83, at 118; R. 614) (emphasis added).

Thus, the

trial court expressly ruled that Rothey had not raised the
affirmative defense of res judicata and that that defense
could not be considered.
Under these circumstances, Rothey cannot now be
heard to support the trial court's ruling on the basis of an
affirmative defense which the trial court expressly rejected.
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The absence of a cross-appeal from Rothey challenging that
finding of the trial court precludes Rothey from making such
an argument here.
Walters v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Phoenix, 131 Ariz. 32, 641 P.2d 235 (1982), is
directly on point.

The plaintiffs in that case sued defen-

dant for damages in connection with the purchase of an apartment complex.

The plaintiffs had been involved in a previous

lawsuit involving the same apartment complex.
were unsuccessful in that prior lawsuit.

The plaintiffs

The jury in the

second lawsuit returned a verdict in favor of the defendant
and the plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the defendant argued

at length, apparently relying on the fact of the plaintiffs1
loss in the prior lawsuit, that the plaintiffs1 claims were
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

The Arizona

Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument and stated as
follows:
At the outset, we reject [the defendant's] contention, argued at length and
repeated numerous times throughout its
brief, that all of plaintiffs' substantive claims are barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. We do not reach the
merits of this defense because [the
defendant] should have raised this contention by way of a cross-appeal.
In the absence of a cross-appeal,
the appellee can defend only as to the
arguments allowed in the trial court and
cannot present rejected claims in an
answering brief. Because [the defendant]
seeks to assert a defense which was not
permitted in the trial court, a crossDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appeal should have been filed ....
641 P.2d, at 238 (emphasis added).
The same rule was stated by the court in Cooper v. Albuquerque National Bank, 75 N.M. 295, 404 P.2d 125, 133 (1965):
"[T]he rule is that findings of fact unfavorable to appellee,
not attacked by cross-appeal, must stand."

See Terry v.

Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah
1980); Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Sorenson, 101 Utah
305, 121 P.2d 398, 401 (1942).
Under these precedents, Rothey cannot argue, as he
does at page 14 of his brief, "that the defense of res judicata acts to bar the recovery of the disputed attorney's fees
here at issue and that the trial court erred in not making
such a ruling."

(Emphasis added).

The trial court found

specifically that Rothey had not pleaded the defense of res
judicata.

If Rothey wishes to disagree with that finding

before this Court, he must do so by way of a cross-appeal.
The time for cross-appealing under Rule 75(d), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, having passed, this Court cannot properly
consider Rothey1s challenge to the trial court's ruling.

See

Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 617 P.2d
700 (Utah 1980).
B. The Bank's Claim to the Attorney's Fees at Issue is not Barred by the
Doctrine of Res Judicata.
Assuming arguendo that Rothey can properly assert
a res judicata defense, the doctrine of res judicata has no
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application to this case.

In order for the affirmative

defense of res judicata to succeed, its proponent must show
(a) the existence of a prior suit between the same parties
and (b) that the prior suit involved the same cause of
action.

Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah

1978).

Rothey's res judicata theory fails to satisfy either

prerequisite.

Neither of the Actions were between the

parties to this lawsuit.

More importantly, neither of the

Actions concerned a cause of action even similar to, much
less "the same as," the issues presented in this lawsuit.
First, for res judicata to apply, the prior action
must be between the same parties as the parties to the present action.

Rothey does state that the parties to the

Actions "were the same as, or in privity with, the parties to
this action."

Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 15-16.

However, Rothey provides absolutely no support for this
conclusion.

The parties to the Actions (LeGrande L. Belnap

and the Bank) are plainly not the same as the parties to this
lawsuit (Rothey and the Bank).

Rothey has not demonstrated

the existence of any privity between LeGrande L. Belnap and
himself.
Rothey1s res judicata defense must also fail because the Actions did not involve the same cause of action as
this case.

The Actions "were either a direct or indirect

attack by Mr. Belnap on either the validity of the title of
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the reputed owner, Utahna Belnap, to the property covered by
the Trust Deed or an attack on the integrity of the underlying security document, namely the Trust Deed."

(Finding No.

4; R. 341). Neither of the Actions upon which res judicata
is based concerned an effort to recover the amounts secured
by the Trust Deed or to foreclose the Trust Deed, as does
this case.

Indeed, the Bank did not even have a personal

claim against LeGrande L. Belnap for recovery of its
attorney's fees incurred under the Trust Deed, to which Mr.
Belnap was not a party.

The Bank's only recourse, as far as

Mr. Belnap was concerned, was against the property secured by
the Trust Deed, in which Belnap claimed an interest.
Furthermore, Utah's one action rule, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-37-1 (Repl. 1977), would preclude an action to
recover a personal judgment for attorney's fees secured by a
trust deed prior to foreclosure of the trust deed itself.
Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Utah 1978). 2
Foreclosure of the Trust Deed would, of course, require the

Rothey's theory of res judicata, when read in conjunction
with the one action rule, would have the obviously incorrect
consequence of forcing the Bank judicially to foreclose its
Trust Deed in the Actions to recover the attorney's fees at
issue, rather than pursuing a non-judicial trustee's sale
procedure, which the trust deed statute explicitly allows.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-1-23 (Repl. 1974).
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joinder of those holding junior interests in the subject
property, who were not parties to the Actions, but who were
necessarily joined as parties defendant to the Bank's
counterclaim in this case.

(R. 55, paragraph 3; R. 56,

paragraph 10).
The foregoing serves to highlight the ridiculous
character of Rothey's belated and unpleaded res judicata
defense.

The Actions concerned the validity of the Trust

Deed; this case concerns the recovery of amounts secured by
the Trust Deed —
action.

the two are plainly different causes of

The Bank's right to claim its attorney's fees

incurred in connection with the Actions was not at issue in
the Actions, nor is there any evidence that the Trust Deed
should, or even could, have been foreclosed at the time of
the Actions.
Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), demonstrates that res judicata is inapplicable here.

The plain-

tiff in Schaer instituted suit for a declaratory judgment
that a certain road, the "dugway road," on his property was
highway dedicated to the public use.

The State defended on

the ground of the res judicata effect of a prior lawsuit.
The prior lawsuit involved the same plaintiff and the State'
condemnation of land contiguous to the dugway road.

The

trial court rejected the State's res judicata argument and
this Court affirmed.

This Court rejected the State's res

judicata argument with the following statement:
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[W]e have determined that res judicata is
not applicable to the present case because it is based on a different claim,
demand, or cause of action than that of
the [prior] litigation. The two causes
of action rest on a different state of
facts and evidence of a different kind or
character is necessary to sustain the two
causes of action. Moreover, the evidence
of the two causes of action relates to
the status of the property in two completely different and separate time
periods. Thus, the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply to preclude the
plaintiff from maintaining his present
cause of action. 657 P.2d, at 1340.
The Court's reasoning in Schaer applies here to bar Rothey's
attempt to attach res judicata effect to the Actions. The
Actions did not in any respect involve the Bank's right to
recover attorney's fees under the Trust Deed or the amount of
such fees.
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork v. Spanish Fork
South Irrigation Co., 107 Utah 279, 153 P.2d 547 (1944), is
also apposite.

The dispute in that case revolved around the

defendant irrigation company's issuance of two different
stock certificates representing the same share in the
company.

The plaintiff, the holder of one of the certifi-

cates, first brought a mandamus action to compel the defendant to issue a new certificate.

The court in that action

ruled that the plaintiff's certificate was void and conferred
upon the holder no rights as a stockholder.

The plaintiff

brought a second suit against the defendant for the value of
the stock purportedly represented by the void certificate.
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The defendant defended, in part, on the ground that the prior
mandamus action precluded the plaintiff's second action under
the doctrine of res judicata.

The trial court rejected the

defendant's argument and this Court affirmed, stating:
The rights claimed in this suit, although
growing out of the same subject matter,
gave rise to a distinct or separate cause
of action and were not put in issue in
the former suit. Furthermore, the questioned issues in this suit are neither
germane to nor essentially connected with
the actual issues raised in the mandamusproceedings. In such cases the doctrine"
of res adjudicata is not applicable.
153 P.2d, at 55T (emphasis added).
The facts here are closely analogous to those of Commercial
Bank.

The first suit in Commercial Bank determined whether

plaintiff was entitled to a certificate, while here the
Actions determined that the Bank held a valid Trust Deed.
The second suit in Commercial Bank sought damages for defendant's failure properly to issue the certificate, while this
case seeks to recover fees and costs under the now judicially
validated Trust Deed.

Res judicata is inapplicable here for

the same reason.
Finally, Rothey has failed to come to grips with
the absurd consequences of his position on res judicata.

In

order to accept Rothey's argument that the Actions operate to
bar the Bank's recovery of the attorney's fees as part of its
foreclosure under the Trust Deed, the Court must rule that
every time a holder of a trust deed is joined in an action
concerning either the property covered by a trust deed or the
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trust deed itself, he must foreclose at that time in order to
protect his right to claim attorney's fees incurred in
3
connection with such an action as part of the indebtedness
secured by the trust deed.

In effect, the holder of the

trust deed would be legally coerced into foreclosing against
his will —

a nonjudicial trustee's sale would be barred by

res judicata.

Such a preposterous result is not contemplated

under the doctrine of res judicata.
POINT II.
ROTHEY'S DEFENSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
JUDGMENT IS NOT PERSUASIVE
The second portion of Rothey's Brief attempts to
support the trial court's judgment on its own terms.

Rothey

stumbles at the outset, however, over the unarguable fact
that he neither pleaded nor argued the estoppel theory
created by the trial court to support its judgment.

The best

face that Rothey can put on his failure to plead or argue the
trial court's theory is the fact that Rothey's Fourth Defense
to the Bank's counterclaim stated as follows:
The Defendant has waived and/or is estopped to claim, as a part of the foreclosure of the subject Trust Deed and
Trust Deed Note, the fees, costs and
o
Trust deeds generally provide (as did the Bank's here) that
attorney's fees incurred by the beneficiary in defending the
validity or priority of the trust deed in question are an
indebtedness secured by the trust deed.
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expenses which Defendant has claimed in
its Counterclaim.
(Reply to Counterclaim, Fourth Defense; R. 80, quoted at page
19 of the brief of respondent-plaintiff)• It is true that
Rothey utilized the word "estoppel" in his Fourth Defense.
Rothey neglects to point out, however, that when asked by way
of interrogatory to "[s]tate each fact supporting or
providing the basis for the allegations contained in Fourth
Defense of the Reply to Counterclaim herein" Rothey stated as
follows:
The Plaintiff relies for his Fourth
Defense upon the fact that tender was
made and accepted as stated in answer to
Interrogatory No. 6 above and further
upon the fact that the Defendant, as
special administrator of the estate of
Utahna P. Belnap, was entitled to seek
the payment for all services rendered in
that capacity as part of said proceeding.
By reason of the fact that the Defendant
failed to make application for reimbursement for all services rendered as part of
this proceeding Defendant is thereby
estopped from seeking those fees as part
of the foreclosure of the subject Trust
Deed.
(Answers of Plaintiff to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories No. 7; R. 153) (emphasis added).

Rothey also

fails to note that at no time prior to the trial court's
announcement of the decision was the trial court's theory
mentioned, considered, or conceived by any party to this
case.
Plainly, the estoppel theory pleaded by Rothey
bears no relation whatsoever to the theory created by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

trial court.

The trial court ruled that the Bank was es-

topped to claim the disputed attorney's fees because it had
failed to keep the trustor and her successors advised of the
attorney's fees and other expenses it was incurring in its
defense against the Actions.

This unique and unprecedented

theory has nothing to do with Rothey's defense based on the
fact that the Bank failed to request attorney's fees in
connection with the probate of the estate of Utahna Belnap.
The law is clear that estoppel must be pleaded with
particularity, and pleading one kind of estoppel does not
permit proof of another.

Kirk v. Kirk, 205 Okla. 482, 238

P.2d 808, 810 (1951); In re Anderson's Estate, 121 Mont. 515,
194 P.2d 621, 626-627 (1948).

"Where a party seeks to raise

an estoppel to a claim set forth in the pleadings, facts
constituting an estoppel must be pleaded."

Tracy Loan &

Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d
388, 391 (1942) (emphasis added).

Under these clear prece-

dents, Rothey's failure either to plead or offer any proof
with respect to the estoppel theory created by the trial
court underscores the trial court's error.

As the Court

stated in Lagoon Co. v. Utah State Fair Association, 117 Utah
213, 214 P.2d 614, 616 (1950), "[t]he claim of estoppel must
fail because of the lack of pleadings and evidence to allege
and show such a defense."
Rothey's reliance on Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d
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205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963) (see Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at
20-22), to support the trial court's creative jurisprudence
is entirely misplaced.

In fact, Cheney actually supports the

Bank's position on this issue.

The Court in that case es-

chewed a crabbed or formalistic reading of the requirement of
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that affirmative
defenses must be pleaded.

The point of Rule 8(c), the Court

stated, was notice, not a blind reliance on the pleadings.
As the Court put it, "[w]hat they are entitled to is notice
of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them."
P.2d, at 91.

381

In this case, the Bank received no notice of

the estoppel theory ultimately created by the trial court.
Rothey never pleaded nor argued such a theory and the Bank
had no opportunity to meet it. Under Cheney, therefore, the
trial court's reliance on an affirmative defense neither
pleaded nor argued by Rothey was error.
Rothey also argues that the Bank was not prejudiced
by the fact that the estoppel theory created by the trial
court was neither pleaded nor argued by Rothey.

Rothey

claims that the Bank has not alleged "that had it understood
the estoppel claim it would have (a) produced other evidence
which was precluded, or (b) given other arguments which were
not given."

Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 22. Rothey's

claim in this regard is difficult to fathom.

Had the Bank
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known that the trial court was going to rule based on the
estoppel theory it created, the Bank would have argued vigorously the numerous reasons why neither the facts nor the law
support such a theory.

One need only look to the bulk of the

Bank's Brief in chief to discover the arguments the Bank
would have made to the trial court had the Bank been on
notice as to the theory the trial court would ultimately
create.

See Brief of Appellant-Defendant at 12-36.

Factually, the Bank would have offered proof that, contrary
to the trial court's findings, Rothey was reasonably advised
of the Bank's attorney's fees.

That would not have been

difficult, since Rothey himself was counsel to Mr. Belnap in
the Actions.

The Bank's prejudice resulting from lack of

such notice is palpable.
Rothey's final attempt to support the trial court's
unique estoppel theory is his argument that he and his predecessors relied to their detriment on the Bank's failure to
give notice of the disputed attorney's fees.

Beyond the fact

that neither the law nor the Trust Deed imposed a duty on the
Bank to give such notice, (see Brief of Appellant-Defendant
at 21-28), there was absolutely no evidence of detrimental
reliance on the Bank's actions in this regard produced by
Rothey at trial.

The record contains no hint that Rothey or

his predecessors in interest would have acted any differently
than they did had the Bank notified them of its claims and
the amounts of the disputed attorney's fees.

This fact is
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underscored when it is noticed that Rothey's Brief does not
cite a scrap of evidence supporting his argument on this
issue.

Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 23-27.

It is not

surprising, therefore, that the trial court made no finding
as to reliance.

Since reliance is an essential part of any

estoppel defense, Jones v. Department of Employment Security,
641 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah 1982), the trial court's theory, even
if lawful, pleaded, and at issue, must fail.
POINT III
THE LAW OF INDEMNITOR/INDEMNITEE IS
A USEFUL ANALOGY IN THIS CASE
In its Brief in chief, the Bank asserts that the
trial court's judgment is inconsistent with applicable law
concerning contracts of indemnity.

In particular, the Bank

demonstrates that, unless specifically required by the terms
of the indemnification agreement itself, an indemnitee has no
duty to notify his indemnitor that he is incurring expenses
for which the indemnitor may ultimately be liable.
Appellant-Defendant at 21-25.

Brief of

Rothey attempts to undermine

the Bank's criticism of the trial court's unprecedented
action by pointing out the difference between contracts of
indemnity and the Trust Deed.
at 27-29.

Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff

It is informative to note, however, that Rothey

(a) never addresses the fact that he did not plead the existence of such a duty on the Bank's part, (b) offers absolutely
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no case law in support of the existence of such a duty,

and

(c) fails to explain why, even if such a duty exists in the
law, he failed to offer any proof at trial that it had been
breached by the Bank.

Nevertheless, Rothey's effort to

explain away the cases relied upon by the Bank is not
persuasive.
Rothey first argues that the cases cited by the
Bank involve situations where the indemnitor had actual
knowledge of the facts giving rise to the claim of indemnity.
Brief of Appellant-Defendant at 19-20.

It is difficult to

discern Rothey1s point in this regard.

As the passages

quoted in the Bank's brief make clear, these cases stand for
the proposition that notice of the claim of indemnity need
not be given to the indemnitor by the indemnitee.

The cases

can hardly be cited for the proposition that an indemnitor

4
At page 28 of his brief, Rothey states: "the rule is that
in most situations an indemnitor is not bound by a judgment
or settlement made by an indemnitee, and is thus not bound to
pay the indemnity amount, unless notice and an opportunity to
defend are first given to the indemnitor." The cases cited
by Rothey do not support, much less state, this so-called
rule. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Dobry Flour Mills, 211 F.
2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert7~dehied 348 U.S. 832 (1954), and
Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 689, 509
P. 2d~86 (1973), are cases where the indemnitor had knowledge
of the claim in dispute because the indemnitee actually
requested that the indemnitor himself defend the claim in
question. Neither case stands for the proposition that such
a request, or even notice, is required in the absence of such
a requirement in the contract of indemnity.
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must have actual knowledge of the claim of indemnity in order
for the indemnitee to recover.

If that were true, the cases

would hold that the indemnitee is bound to give notice of his
claim to the indemnitor; a holding directly contrary to the
actual holding of the cases.
Rothey next argues that the foreclosure of a
security interest in real property is an action at equity and
that the contract principles which define the
indemnitee/indemnitor relationship are therefore not
applicable to this case.
28-29.

Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at

However, Rothey ignores the fact that the

relationship between the parties to a trust deed is
controlled by the trust deed as a matter of contract.

"A

mortgage is governed by the same rules of interpretation that
apply to written instruments generally."
Davis, 559 P.2d 538, 540 (Utah 1977).

Bank of Ephraim v.

The Trust Deed in this

case provides that the Bank may defend against actions like
the Actions and add costs incurred in such defense to the
amount secured by the Trust Deed.

The trial court

specifically found this to be true.

Conclusions Nos. 3 and

4; R. 347-348. This relationship, created as a matter of
contract by the Trust Deed, is that of indemnitor (the
Trustor) and indemnitee (the Bank):

"Indemnity may be

defined as the obligation resting on one party to make good
loss or damage another party has incurred."

Rossmoor

Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 119 Cal. Rptr. 449, 532 P.2d
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97, 100 (1975).

Consequently, the cases cited by the Bank at

pages 22-25 of its Brief in chief are helpful in underscoring
the fact that neither the trial court nor Rothey have offered
any legal support whatsoever for the unique duty created by
the trial court to support its equally unprecedented estoppel
theory.
The Bank also points out that Rothey has made no
attempt to answer the arguments set out at pages 25-28 of the
Bank's Brief.

As the Court will recall, the Bank there

argues that the trial court's estoppel theory is ill-founded
as well as unprecedented.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE THAT THE
BANK FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT WAS
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Rothey's final argument is that the judgment should
be affirmed because the trial court concluded that the Bank
failed to prove it was entitled to any attorney's fees in
connection with its defense against the Actions.

Rothey

contends that the trial court found that the evidence relied
upon by the Bank to support the amount of its claim was
"poisoned and should be totally discounted."
Respondent-Plaintiff at 31.

Brief of

Rothey concludes from this that,

even if the trial court's estoppel theory is unsupportable,
its judgment should stand and "a remand of this case for any
. . . reason would be to no avail.

Even if it could be shown
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that the Bank was entitled to any fees, it has failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the amount of those fees."
Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 32. First and foremost, the
trial court did not so rule —

the trial court ruled only

that a portion of the statements of the Bank's counsel
comingled services.
The trial court found and concluded as follows with
respect to this claim:
[Findings of Fact]
5. That the Bank appeared in and
defended each of the above-entitled
actions and expended attorney's fees in
connection with each action^
13. That commencing in 1974 counsel
for the Bank prepared, on a periodic
basis, statements for their services
rendered, which statements were submitted
to the Bank for payment and itemized the
services performed not only for Civil
Actions Nos. 209266 and 211151, but also
other actions in which LeGrande L. Belnap
was involved. The statements paid by the
Bank and produced at trial totalled
$31,130.49 for services rendered concerning Civil Actions Nos. 209266 and 211151
and certain other actions in which
LeGrande Belnap was involved.
15. That certain of the statements
for services rendered comingled services
rendered in connection with Civil Nos.
211151 and 209266 with several other
matters of litigation which the Court
finds not to be specifically related to
the above numbered actions and for which
the Bank was not justified in charging
fees pursuant to the Trust Deed which is
the subject matter of this action.
16. That by reason of time and the
manner in which certain of the statements
for attorneys' fees were drafted, the
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Court is unable to determine what portion
of the time listed on said statements is
reasonable and legitimate in connection
with Civil Nos. 211151 and 209266 and
which is unreasonable and unrelated
expense,
[Conclusion of Law]
5. That the defendant has failed to
show that the total sum of $31,130.49
constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee
or that all of said fees were incurred in
connection with any action purporting to
affect the security of the Trust Deed,
the title to the subject property, or the
rights or powers of the beneficiary or
Trustee.
(R. 342-348) (emphasis added).
Thus, according to the Court's own findings, the
Bank expended attorney's fees in connection with each of the
Actions.

(Finding of Fact No. 5; R. 342). In addition, the

Court found that "certain of the statements for services
rendered comingled services rendered in [the Actions] with
several other matters" and that by reason of the manner in
which "certain of the statements" were drafted, the Court was
unable to determine the portion of the time listed on "said
statements" is reasonable.
R. 345-46).

(Finding of Fact Nos. 15 and 16;

Thus, based upon the Court's own Findings, only

"certain" of the statements so comingled services and only
"certain" of the attorney's fees might be disallowed on this
basis, even assuming that all of the Court's findings are
adequately supported by the evidence.

They are not.
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James Lowrie testified that he was the attorney of
record for the Bank in Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151 (the
Actions) throughout their duration (T., 2/7/83, at 37-38; R.
409-410).

The Bank was involved in certain actions in addi-

tion to Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151.

For example, case

number Civil No. 211425 was consolidated by the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County with Civil No.
211151.

(T., 2/7/83, at 51; R. 423). Part of the subject

matter of Civil No. 211425 was an effort to enjoin the prosecution of a California Superior Court case involving certain
real estate property in California.

That case will

hereinafter be referred to as the "California Case."

As a

part of Civil No. 211425, LeGrande L. Belnap sought to enjoin
the prosecution of the California Case.
52; R. 423-24).

9T., 2/7/83, at 51-

In addition, the probate of the estate of

Utahna P. Belnap was consolidated with Civil Nos. 211151 and
209266.

(T., 2/7/83, at 52-53; R. 424-25).

As a plain

consequence of the interrelationship of these cases, it was
practically impossible to separate the services that were
rendered separately with respect to each.
Mr. Lowrie gave the Court a general summary of all
services performed in Civil No. 209266.
70; R. 439-442).

(T., 2/7/83, at 67-

That description of services included the

initial preparation of an Answer, discovery, motions, the
trial court's dismissal with prejudice, an appeal to this
Court, and an affirmance of the Bank's position.
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Mr. Lowrie

also described generally the services rendered by his firm to
the Bank with respect to Civil No. 211151, beginning with the
filing of an Answer and Counterclaim, conducting of
discovery, the engagement of and examination of experts,
preparations for trial, the trial court's last-minute
granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment, an appeal to this
Court, and an affirmance of the Bank's position.

(T.,

2/7/83, at 70-81; R. 442-453).
Mr. Lowrie then identified all of the statements
sent by his firm to the Bank covering services rendered in
connection with Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151.
at 81 £t seq.; R. 453 ejt seq.).
evidence.

(T., 2/7/83,

Exhibit 14 was received into

(T., 2/7/83, at 85; R. 457). Mr. Lowrie reviewed

each of the statements and testified about the services
rendered and the amount of the time expended on each.
2/7/83, at 87 et seq.; R. 459 et seq.).

In addition, Mr.

Lowrie testified, without contradiction, as follows:
Q. Have you reviewed your record to
determine approximately how much time you
personally have spent in the defense of
the Bank in Civil No. 211151 and 209266?
A. Well, in defense of the Bank in
an assertion of the Counterclaim through
the conclusion of the appeal and the
matters I reviewed, yes, I have.
Q. And how many hours did you
personally spend?
A.

(T.,

In excess of 455 hours.

Q. Have you reviewed your records
to determine the total number of hours
spent by legal personnel in the defense
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of the Bank in 209266, and in defense of
. the Bank in the prosecution of the declaratory judgment counterclaim in 211151?
A. Yes.
Q. And how many hours, in the
aggregate, have legal personnel of Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough expended in
those?
A.

In excess of 622.

Q. And what is the range of hourly
rates charged by the lawyers — not law
clerks but lawyers of Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough for those services?
A.

Well --

Q. I realize that the statements
reflect them but just give us a range.
A. For Mr. Waldo, they were free.
Otherwise they range from $35 an hour to
$95 an hour.
Q. Do you have an opinion as to the
reasonableness of the fees that were
charged to the Bank for the defense of
the Bank in 209266 and 211151, and if the
prosecution of the declaration judgment
counterclaim in the latter case?
A.

Yes I do.

Q.

What is that? ***

A. In my opinion, our fees have
ranged from reasonable and generous to
the Bank.
(T., 2/7/83, at 90-92; R. 462-464).

There thus exists an

uncontroverted basis for the recovery of attorney's fees that
does not place reliance on any of the statements of Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough.
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Further, counsel for Rothey stipulated that one
attorney, Robyn Heilbrun, expended 141.6 hours on behalf of
the Bank in conjunction with Civil No. 209266 at a billing
rate of between $45 and $60 per hour:
Mr. Smith [Rothey1s counsel]: Your
Honor, maybe we can shorten : she is
simply going to testify to what is
already in the statements, its there. We
have an attorney's representation as to
what he thinks is reasonable and how many
hours and what was done and so forth, and
we have been through that. Its just
compounded, and I don't believe we need
it.
The Court: He's given you a man's
perspective of that and she'll give you a
woman's perspective.
Mr. Smith: Probably the better
perspective as well, but —
Mr. Maak: We might be able to
stipulate to a lot of this right now. If
we will stipulate that she did what the
statements say she did, then —
Mr. Smith: I'll stipulate that what
he's put down there is what she would
testify she did, and that's —
Ms. Heilbrun: That's the testimony
I would proffer, Your Honor.
Mr. Smith:
that.
Mr. Maak:
many hours?

I have no problem with
And that you expended how

Ms. Heilbrun:
Mr. Smith:
ment?

141.6 hours myself.

Is that in the state-

Ms. Heilbrun: Yes. That is the
addition of the statements.
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Mr. Smith: We can do that. And
that's in 209266 and 211151?
Ms. Heilbrun: Yes.
Mr. Maak: And your billing rate for
this period of time was between what and
what?
Ms. Heilbrun:

$45 and $60.

Mr. Smith: It's certainly unconscionable, but if that's what she's going
to testify to, I have no problem.
The Court: Is that the billing rate
to Walker Bank and Trust Company?
Ms. Heilbrun:

Yes, Your Honor.

Mr. Maak: And finally, that the
charges that were made to the Bank for
her services were a reasonable fee for
the service that she rendered in her
opinion?
Mr. Smith: I think Mr. Lowrie has
already testified to the entire fee.
Mr. Maak: She spent a significant
amount of time. I just wanted her to be
here.
Mr. Smith: I would stipulate with
him as to what's been indicated here as
being what her testimony would be.
The Court:

So your time was 141.6?

Ms. Heilbrun: Through May of 1981.
That does not include nonjudicial foreclosure or foreclosure in this case,
which Mr. Lowrie has testified to.
(T., 2/7/83, at 121-125; R. 492-494)(emphasis added).

Thus,

the parties stipulated that Ms. Heilbrun would testify that
she expended 141.6 hours at the rate of between $45 and $60
per hour and expended 141.6 hours "in 209266 and 211151."
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Finally, it will be remembered that the trial court
found that only "certain of" the Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough firm's statements to the Bank comingled services.
Included in the record on appeal is plaintiff's Exhibit 14,
which consists of the statements rendered by the Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough firm to the Bank for this and
other matters.

Many of those statements separately itemize

the services and charges attributable exclusively to Civil
Nos. 209266 and 211151.

The following are only illustrative.

STATEMENT
DATE

PAGE
NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

5/11/76

1

Only concerned 209266 and 211151

6/1/78

6

Concerns only 209266

8/1/78

5

Concerns only 209266

10/4/78

5

Concerns only 209266

9/16/76

Each statement specifies the services that were
rendered in conjunction with Belnap matters.

The trial court

had before it the court's complete files in both Civil Nos.
209266 and 211151.

(T., 2/7/83, at 25; R. 397). From those

files, the Court can compare the dates upon which proceedings
occurred in each of those cases and the references in the
statements (such as preparation of brief, appearance at
hearing, etc.) with the description of services to determine,
with certainty, the case to which the services related.
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In summary, the following independent evidentiary
bases were presented to the trial court as evidence of a
reasonable fee for services rendered by the Bank's counsel in
conjunction with the Actions, Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151:
First, Mr. Lowrie, the Bank's counsel, independently testified to the time expended and the range of reasonable fees
that he charged.

Second, Rothey's counsel stipulated that

one of the Bank's counsel, Robyn Heilbrun, expended 141.6
hours at an hourly rate of between $45 and $60 for services
rendered in conjunction with Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151.
Third, many of the Bank's statements do not comingle cases
upon which services were rendered and provide an independent
evidentiary basis for the recovery of those fees.

Fourth,

even those few statements that comingled some services could
be divided between the various cases based upon the contents
of the files in Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151, both of which
were before the trial court.

Fifth, Mr. Lowrie testified,

without contradiction, that the services rendered in Civil
Nos. 209266 and 211151 were related to other actions, which
were consolidated with the subject cases, and that the services rendered in conjunction with those other action were
reasonably necessary to insure the protection of the Bank's
interests in conjunction with Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151.
Last, the trial court had before it Mr. Lowrie's description
of the services that he rendered, and a file depicting the
exact services rendered in conjunction with each case, both
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of which provided an independent evidentiary basis upon which
the trial court could have fixed a reasonable fee for the
attorney's fees in question.
This case must be remanded to the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County for a determination of the
amount of costs and attorney's fees due the Bank under the
Trust Deed and for further proceedings to foreclose the Trust
Deed.
CONCLUSION
Rothey's Brief fails to address or addresses inadequately all of the arguments made in the Bank's Brief in
chief.

First, Rothey does not deny that the trial court

found every fact necessary to support the Bank's recovery of
its attorney's fees and costs incurred in the Actions.
Second, Rothey does not deny that the trial court expressly
rejected each defense advanced by Rothey's pleadings and
arguments.

Third, Rothey's contention that he asserted the

estoppel theory ultimately created by the trial court is
belied by Rothey's answers to the Bank's interrogatories.
Rothey never pleaded nor argued any theory even remotely
resembling the theory created by the trial court, and
Rothey's Brief does not argue to the contrary.

Fourth,

Rothey cites no law in support of the trial court's theory
and fails to respond to the Bank's argument that that theory
is contrary to good sense.

Fifth, Rothey has not cited to

any evidence to support the finding, essential to the trial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court's dispositive theory, that the Bank failed timely to
advise Rothey or his predecessors that it claimed the subject
fees.

Sixth, Rothey does not contend that the trial court

made any finding that Rothey or his predecessors relied in
any respect upon the Bank's conduct.

Last, Rothey's claim

that the Bank did not prove that any attorney's fees were
recoverable is contrary to the trial court's findings and the
record.
The Bank's arguments remain essentially unrebutted,
and a plainer case for reversal cannot be conceived.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j&

day of June, 1984.

ROOKER, LARSEljL KIMBALL & PARR

Z.

Maak, Of Counsel
B. Green, Esq.
Attorneys for AppellantDefendant
First Interstate Bank of Utah
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